

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 243207

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT USMISSION NATO SENT SECSTATE PRIORITY

SEPT 29

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 5300

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, RH

SUBJ: EEC BRIEFING: KISSINGER MISSION TO RHODESIA

UK DELEGATION PROVIDED US ON SEPT 29 WITH AN ABRIDGED

VERSION OF THE BRIEFING ON RHODISA GIVEN TO THE EEC AMBASSADORS

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IN LONDON ON SEPT 28 BY THE HEAD OF THE RHODESIA DEPARTMENT OF

THE FCO. UK DEL NOTED THAT IT HAD RECIEVED THIS BRIEFING AFTER THE PERMREP LUNCHEON OF YESTERDAY SO THAT SIR JOHN KILLICK WAS UNABLE TO DRAW ON IT DURING LUNCHEON DISCUSSIONS ON RHODESIA. TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

I. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR FORBEARANCE IN NOT PRESSING US FOR INFORMATION ON US/UK. CONSULTATIONS LEADING UP TO, AND DURING, THE KISSINGER MISSION TO AFRICA. THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY HAD BEEN OF PRIME IMPORTANCE. ANY PREMATURE LEAK MIGHT HAVE ENABLED SMITH TO UNDERMINE THE PRESSURES ON HIM TO ACCEPT EARLY MAJORITY RULE.

II. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH IN HIS STATEMENT OF 24 SEPT HAD BEEN CONCEIVED BY US AND WERE FORESHADOWED IN MR. CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT OF 22 MARCH. BUT DR. KISSINGER HAD BEEN THE MIDWIFE. HIS INTERVENTION HAD BEEN DECISIVE.

III. ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF MR. ENNALS' VISIT TO EAST AFRICA IN LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL HAD BEEN TO SEEK A BROAD ENDORSEMENT OF THE PACKAGE FROM THE QUOTE FRONT-LINE UNQUOTE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS, AND THROUGH THEM, FROM THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST LEADERS.

IV. WE HAD HOPED THAT THE NATIONALIST LEADERS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SHELVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND AGREE UPON A COMMON PROGRAMME OF ACTION. ONCE OUR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE AFRICAN SIDE WE HAD HOPED TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ON THE ILLEGAL REGIME TO ACCEPT THEM. BUT PRESIDENT NYERERE HAD ASKED US TO HOLD OUR HAND UNTIL THE PRESIDENTS HAD MADE A FURTHER EFFORT TO REUNITE THE RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS.

V. FOLLOWING HIS SPEECH IN LUSAKA ON 27 APRIL, ENDORSING MR. CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT OF 22 MARCH, DR. KISSINGER HAD HAD HIS FIRST MEETING IN ZURICH WITH MR. VORSTER. HE HAD REPORTED TO US THAT MR. VORSTER WOULD BE WILLING, IF THE AMERICANS COULD COME UP WITH SUITABLE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO GET THEM ACCEPTED BY SMITH.

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VI. DR. KISSINGER HAD ASKED US TO PRODUCE A PLAN. THIS WE HAD DONE: IT WAS PASSED BY THE AMERICANS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES BEFORE DR. KISSINGER'S SECOND MEETING WITH VORSTER IN ZURICH IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. AS A RESULT OF THAT MEETING, DR. KISSINGER HAD BEEN SATISFIED THAT MR. VORSTER WOULD PLAY HIS PART IN GETTING THE PROPOSAL ACCEPTED. DR. KISSINGER THEN SET OFF ON HIS MISSION TO AFRICA.

VII. WHY HAD SMITH CAPITULATED? THE REGIME HAD LONG BEEN AWARE THAT RHODESIA WAS FIGHTING A QUOTE NO WIN UNQUOTE WAR. THEY WERE FACED WITH THE PROSPECT OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PUTTING INTOLERABLE STRAINS ON THEIR D RESERVES OF MANPOWER. ALSO, THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE WAS RUNNING OUT FAST AND (AS SHOWN BY THE WHITE EMIGRATION FIGURES) WHITE MORALE WAS EBBING RAPIDLY. BUT THE DECISIVE FACTOR WAS KISSINGER'S INTERVENTION AND THE FACT THAT HE AND MR. VORSTER HAD MADE IT PLAIN TO SMITH THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO HIS RESCUE.

VIII. THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY DR. KISSINGER TO PRESIDENTS NYERERE AND KAUNDA BUT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THEIR STATUS. MR. SMITH (AND MR. VORSTER) CLEARLY REGARDED THEM AS CONSTITUTING FIXED ELEMENTS OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, WHILE THE PRESIDENTS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN EXPECTING THEM TO EMERGE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

IX. THE TONE OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMUNIQUE, FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT AT LUSAKA, WAS HARSH. BUT, IN SUBSTANCE, WE DID NOT REGARD IT AS A REJECTION OF THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH. THE PRESIDENTS SEEMED TO HAVE TWO CHIEF CONCERNS: THAT THE FORM AND STRUCTURE OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT FOR NEGOTIATION, AND THAT SMITH SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE COURSE OF THAT NEGOTIATION. BUT WE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENTS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND WERE CONTENT TO LEAVE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION TO A LATER STAGE.

X. H M G HAD AGREED TO HELP ORGANISE SUCH A NEGOTIATION. MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT ON 26 SEPT TO FOUR OF THE PRESIDENTS EXPLAINING THAT MR. ROWLANDS WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS WITH THEM
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WHERE, AND WHEN, THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE, AND WHO SHOULD TAKE PART.

XI. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER SMITH AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD STILL AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT . HE MIGHT FEEL THAT HE HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO EARLY MAJORITY RULE UNDER THE MISUNDERSTANDING THAT THE PRESIDENTS HAD ACCEPTED IN TOTO (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) THE PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM BY DR. KISSINGER. NEVERTHELESS, HIS PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO EARLY MAJORITY RULE HAD CREATED A NEW SITUATION. WE WERE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT A WHITE RHODESIAN TEAM WOULD AGREE TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATION.

XII. THE PRESIDENTS HAD STILL TO QUOTE DELIVER UNQUOTE A ZIMBABWE NEGOTIATING TEAM. AT THEIR SUMMIT MEETING IN DAR EARLIER

THIS MONTH, THEY APPEARED TO HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ENCOURAGING THOSE POLITICAL LEADERS WHO ENJOYED BACKING AMONG THE GUERRILLAS TO AGREE TO FORM A WORKING COALITION. NKOMO, THE UNDISPUTED LEADER OF ZAPU, HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ESTABLISH LINKS WITH THE ZANU GUERRILLAS AND WITH MUGABE, WHO HAD EMERGED AS THEIR SPOKESMAN.

XIII. IF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL, BRITAIN WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO QUOTE LEGALISE UNQUOTE THAT GOVERNMENT. BUT IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

XIV. THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS ENVISAGED THAT, UPON THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIFTED. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE ABSURD TO MAINTAIN THEM WHEN THEIR RAISON DE'ETRE (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) HAD DISAPPEARED. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE AT NEW YORK TO DISCUSS MODALITIES OF ACTION AT THE UN WHEN THE TIME CAME. MEANWHILE WE WOULD URGE THEM TO CONTINUE TO APPLY SANCTIONS FULLY. IF SANCTIONS WERE NO LONGER TO BE FULLY APPLIED, IT COULD ENCOURAGE SMITH TO RENEGE.

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS (REMARKABLY FEW) THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

A. IN HIS STATEMENT OF 24 SEPT, SMITH HAD FAITHFULLY
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REPRODUCED, WITH MINOR ALTERATIONS, THE PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM BY KISSINGER. BUT HE HAD PUT HIS OWN INTERPRETATION ON THOSE PROPOSALS, IN PARTICULAR, HE HAD CLAIMED THAT THE COUNCIL OF STATE WOULD HAVE QUOTE SUPREME POWER UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT A NECESSARY INFERENCE FROM THE LANGUAGE KISSINGER HAD USED. WE BELIEVED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN ITS ORGANS WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION.

B. H M G WOULD NOT WISH TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. BUT WE ENVISAGED THE APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY, WHO WOULD HAVE A QUASI-DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION AND BE AT HAND TO HELP FURTHER THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION.

C. H M G WOULD OBSERVE THE DUE PROCEDURES AT THE UN ON THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BUT WAYS SHOULD BE EXPLORED OF AVOIDING THE RISK OF A RUSSIAN VETO. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO PROMOTE

A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION RECOGNISING THAT THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT REMOVED THE PREVIOUS THREAT TO

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

D. THE BRITISH/US GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED OR

DISMAYED BY THE REACTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTS. THE PRESIDENTS HAD
MADE IT PLAIN THAT THEY WELCOMED THE RESULTS OF THE
KISSINGER MISSION, ALTHOUGH THEY RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON
THE FORM AND POWERS OF THE ORGANS OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IN
OUR VIEW, THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES
CONCERNED TO EMBARK ON NEGOTIATIONS.
END TEXT

2. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AS APPROPRIATE. STRAUZ-HUPE

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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NNN

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